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1. The transition: A Brief Overview.
The East-Central European communist regimes that came into
power at the close of World War II sought to eradicate the market
mechanism and to insulate their countries from the capitalist West.
Poland was no exception: most of its exports were directed to, and
most of its imports were obtained from other COMECON members, in
particular from the Soviet Union. Gradually, however, the
leadership of PZPR, the Polish United Workers' (communist) party
realized that the command system and isolation from the world
spelled stagnation. Sporadic attempts at reform were made as early
as 1956, but the system remained virtually unchanged for the next
twenty five years.
In the 1970s growth slowed down, while social opposition to
the regime gained in strength. The Party made an abortive effort to
improve economic performance by importing foreign technology. This
strategy having failed, the July 1981 Party Congress adopted a
reform program calling for increasing reliance on the market
mechanism and for the opening of the economy1. But the November 13,
1981 declaration of the "state of war" by Wojciech Jaruzelski, who
combined the offices of Prime Minister, Defence Minister and First
Secretary of PZPR, delayed implementation. After the return to
"normalcy" various measures were taken to decentralize economic
l
. See, The World Bank (1987)
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decision-making. The scope of central allocation of raw materials
was reduced. Enterprises were granted more freedom of decision
concerning production, marketing (including foreign sales) and
investment. The market was allowed a greater role in price
determination. Yet progress was slow: the ruling Party was clearly
aware of the risk that economic reform would lead to the loss of
power.2
The Solidarity-led regime which was formed in the Fall of
19893 inherited a partially liberalized and half-dismantled command
system, and an economy hovering on the verge of a hyperinflation.
It also inherited a staggering foreign debt - the result of the
ill-conceived foreign loan-financed modernization policy of the
1970s.
The new regime faced two immediate tasks: to bring down the
rate of inflation, and to restore internal and external market
equilibrium. January 1, 1990 heralded the implementation of a bold,
2
. See Fallenbuchl (1988) and Poznanski (1988)
3
. In the parliamentary election of June 1989, a 65 per cent
of the seats in the Sejm (the lower chamber) were reserved for the
PZPR and for two satellite parties, the United Peasant Party
(PZPL)and the Democratic Party (SD). Solidarity won all the seats
it was allowed to contest, and 99 out of 100 Senat (upper chamber)
seats. As a compromise between Solidarity and the PZPR General
Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the PZPR, became President, while
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a ranking member of Solidarity became Prime
Minister. Mazowiecki's government included members of Solidarity as
well as members of PZPR, and of the Peasant the Democratic parties.
When the new government was formed, the satellite parties distanced
themselves from the PZPR.
comprehensive stabilization-cum-liberalization program, known as
the "Balcerowicz Plan"4. The budget was balanced by making drastic
cuts in subsidies. Virtually all direct controls limiting internal
and international commercial transactions were swept away. The
currency was made "internally convertible"5. The door was open wide
to foreign investment. Though a number of key issues, among them
the problem of foreign debt, remained to be settled, Poland seemed
to be well on the way to full integration in the world system.
The reforms ran into social and political obstacles. Interest
groups, among whom the farmers were the msot important, pressured
the government to retreat from extreme liberalism. The centrist
governments, formed after the first completely free parliamentary
elections (October 1991), were weak and lacked clear economic
vision, hence they were fearful of further change and ready to
compromise6. Victory in the next parliamentary election (September
1993) went to a Democratic Union (neo-communist) - Peasant Party
alliance. The peasant-neo-communist government asserted its
commitment to the continuation of reform, the tempo of change
slowed down even more, and, in some important respects, there was
retrogression.
4
. So-called after the Finance Minister and Vice -Premier
Leszek Balcerowicz. For a comprehensive discussion of the
Balcerowicz Plan see Wellisz, Kierzkowski and Okolski (1993).
5
. See Section 2
6
. The 1991 election was contested by a large number of small
parties, none of which won enough votes to form a stable
government.
Poland's current position vis-a-vis the world economy was thus
largely determined by the Balcerowicz reforms. The changes that
occurred toward the end of the communist regime constitute, as it
were, a prelude. What happened since is a postlude. A discussion of
Poland's international position must, therefore, pay special
attention to the 1990-1991 period.
The balance of this chapter is organized as follows. Section
2 is devoted to a discussion of the evolution of the foreign
exchange regime. Section 3 discusses foreign trade, Section 4 the
debt problem, and Section 5 the treatment of foreign investment.
Section 6 makes an appraisal of the degree of integration that has
been achieved and looks into the future.
2. The foreign exchange regime7
During the 1980s the "classical" communist system of direct
allocation of foreign currency was replaced by a multiple exchange
system. Less than a third of the available foreign currency
continued to be directly allocated to high priority imports at the
official rate. Enterprises were permitted to retain a portion of
their foreign exchange earnings which could be deposited in
foreign-exchange denominated accounts at Polish banks or utilized
for the purchase of approved imports. Starting May 1987,
7
 A more detailed analysis of the evolution of the foreign
exchange regime will be found in Wellisz (1995)
enterprises were also permitted to sell and purchase foreign
exchange at currency auctions held by the Export Development Bank.
The proportion of earnings that could be retained was industry-
specific, and the auction mechanism was government-controlled,
hence the exchange rate varied from product to product. There was,
also a free rate: individuals were permitted to buy and sell
foreign currency on a semi-legal free market.
The foreign exchange "anchor" January 1 1990, - September 30 1991.
The Solidarity-led government took immediate steps to simplify
the system and narrow the gap between the three rates. During the
Fall of 1989, the official price of the dollar was raised, in
steps, by 390 per cent; in real terms the zloty was devalued by 75
per cent. In September 1989, the free market price of the dollar
was six times higher than the official rate. By the last week of
December, 1989, the official rate stood at 5,600 zl/$, the average
auction rate at 6,000 zl/$ and the free rate at 8,000 to 9,000
zl/$.
The exchange rate regime appropriate for the transition period
was subject to an exhaustive discussion. The need to restore
confidence dictated the establishment of a realistic, sustainable
parity. On the other hand, it was argued that, given the difficulty
of determining the appropriate parity level, it would be preferable
to adopt a flexible system. The government opted for a compromise
course. Within the framework of the reforms instituted on January
1, 1990, foreign currency was made freely available at the official
rate for all current account payments. The retention accounts and
the auction system were abolished. The conversion of export
proceeds into zlotys at the official rate was made obligatory.
Enterprises were permitted to retain, but not to replenish, their
foreign-denominated accounts, and they were not allowed to
establish accounts abroad. Consumers remained free to buy and sell
foreign exchange on the free market8. They were permitted to hold
foreign-exchange denominated accounts in Polish banks, and, up to
a limit, they could take the foreign exchange out of the country
for personal use. The government pledged to maintain the a fixed
exchange rate of 9,500 zl/US $ for three months, after which the
rate could be adjusted, if necessary.
The announcement that the initial exchange rate was to hold
for a pre-determined period opened the door to potentially
destabilizing speculation. In its fight against inflation, the
National Bank of Poland (NBP) set its discount rate (which
constitutes a floor to the interest rate structure) slightly above
the anticipated rate of inflation. The monthly rates for January,
February and March were set respectively at 3 6 per cent, 2 0 per
cent and 10 per cent. Since the rate paid on zloty deposits
closely tracked the discount rate, a depositor who switched from
dollars to zlotys at the beginning of January and back to dollars
8
. The official rate and the free market rate were, however,
never allowed to deviate by more than a few percentage points.
at the end of March could have earned a 70 per cent return on his
dollar savings. Large-scale speculation could have precipitated a
collapse of the exchange rate9. However, the government's
declaration that the rate would remain fixed for three months
seemingly lacked credibility: very little switching and re-
switching took place, and the initial undervaluation of the zloty
permitted the government to adhere to its pledge despite the
liberalization-induced price rise
Within a few months inflation appeared to be well under
control10. If anything, the restrictive monetary and fiscal
policies seemed to be working "too well". There was excessively
rapid accumulation of foreign reserves. The fiscal budget was in
surplus11. There were signals that the stringent policy measures
were about to precipitate a serious recession: the volume of credit
(in real terms) declined; output fell, and unemployment began to
rise.
9
 Guestimates indicate that private dollar hoards totalled $6
to $9 billion, surpassing by a factor of 3 or more the official
reserves.
10
 The monthly rate of increase of the consumer price index
declined from 79.6 per cent in January, 1990 to 4.6 per cent in
May, and to 3.6 per cent in June. Price stability by end-year
seemed to be an achievable goal.
11
. The IMF-approved stabilization plan called for the fiscal
deficit of the first half of the year to be compensated by a second
half-year surplus.
To stimulate the economy the government relaxed its monetary
policies and raised the fiscal expenditures12 The immediate
results were positive. The economy picked up temporarily, while
inflation continued to abate.
By September 1990, the rate of inflation accelerated, however,
while the general economic situation continued to worsen. In 1991
there was a sharp decline in the profits of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) depriving the government of a major source of revenue13. The
budget was again in deficit feeding inflation.14 The zloty
appreciated in real terms until May 17, 1991 when its price was
lowered to 11,000 zl/$. At the same time the zloty was de-linked
from the dollar, and linked to a foreign exchange basket in which
the US$ was assigned a weight of 45 per cent, the DM 3 5 per cent,
the Pound Sterling 10 per cent, and the French and Swiss Francs 5
per cent each.
12
 Measures taken to slow down the accumulation of reserves
also included a temporary reduction or suspension of customs
duties. See section 3 below.
13
. The high paper profits, registered by SOEs in 1990
inflation reflected lags in the revaluation of inventories and of
depreciation allowances. Paper profits were also made on the
increase in the zloty value of foreign exchange accounts held by
enterprises. In 1991 and in the subsequent years the SOEs as a
whole recorded losses.
14
. On this issue, see Gomulka (1994)
The shift to a currency basket was not unjustified. As long as
the dollar linkage was maintained, the fluctuations in the dollar-
ECU exchange rate introduced an extraneous disturbing factor in the
trade between Poland and Western Europe, Poland's main trading
partner. The relative weights in the basket seemed well chosen.
Though trade with the U.S. is of little significance, dollar-priced
imports, such as oil, amount to a substantial proportion of
Poland's imports; hence the assignment of the major weight to the
dollar. The second highest weight attached to the DM reflects the
fact that Germany is Poland's single largest trading partner. The
weights attached to the other currencies also are defensible. But
the linkage to a basket does not have the transparency, and it does
not carry the credibility of linkage to a single, strong currency.
The abandonment of the dollar standard looked like a signal of
retreat from the fixed exchange rate policy.
Table 1
Indexes of Consumer prices and of the real effective exchange
rate,
1991-1994 (1900 = 100)
Year Quarter C.P.I. Real effective exchange rate*














































* in US $/ zloty, adjusted for changes in relative price levels
Source: IMF
The "crawling peer" regime October 1 1991 - May 15, 1995
In the face of a continuing price rise 1S the government
announced, on October 1, 1991, the replacement of the fixed parity
by a "crawling peg". Henceforth the nominal exchange rate of the
zloty was to decline at a preannounced rate. Under such a policy,
called by Dornbusch "the PPP - oriented exchange rule", the nominal
15
. In 1991 the consumer price index rose by 59.1 per cent and
the GDP deflator by 55.3 per cent.
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exchange rate is adjusted to take into account the differential
between the rate of inflation in the home country, and the rate of
inflation of the major trading partners. The initial rate of
"crawl" was set at 1.8 per cent per month (about 24 per cent per
year). The rate of inflation outstripped, however, the rate of
"crawl" and the zloty was devalued by an additional 12 per cent on
February 26, 1992 . Another devaluation (this time by 8 per cent)
came on August 27, 1993, but, as the rate of inflation appeared to
be slowing down, the rate of the "crawl" was cut to 1.6 per cent
per month.
In 1993-1994 the inflationary pressure exercised by budgetary
deficits subsided. The fiscal deficit declined, and the shortfall
in government revenue was covered to an increasing extent through
sale of government obligations on the financial market. As a
consequence, the NBP claims on the general government, expressed
in constant 1990 zlotys, began to decline (Table 2)
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Table 2
Fiscal deficits and domestic reserves of the National Bank of
Poland, 1991 = 1994
(A) (B)
Year Fiscal budget NBP claims on general
surplus or deficit government







(A) Ministry of Finance and World Bank estimates, as reported in
World Bank (1994). The fiscal deficit estimate for 1994 was
reported in Rzeczpospolita no. 259 (3908) of 9.7,1994.
(B) IMF. The constant 1990 zloty values calculated by deflating the
current zloty values by the consumer price index (1990 = 100)
Starting in mid-1993, however, the NBP had to cope with the
inflationary effects of a rapid accumulation of foreign reserves.
These rose from $3.3 billion at the end of the second quarter of
1993, to $5.7 billion at the end of the fourth quarter of 1994.
The sources of this growth are yet to be determined16; it is clear,
however, that the accumulation is related to the undervaluation of
the zloty. To remedy the situation, the NAP reduced the rate of
"crawl" to 1.4 per cent per month in mid-1994, and to 1.2 per cent
per month in January 1995 At the same time, seeking to contain
credit expansion, the NAP set the 1993 discount rate at 35 per cent
per year. In 1994 inflation subsided, and the discount rate was
16
.According to the official trade and capital transaction
statistics, Poland's balance of payments was negative in 1993 and
in 1994. The accumulation of reserves may have arisen as a
consequence of a surplus on unrecorded border trade, or of ann
unrecorded influx of speculative capital.
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lowered to 33 per cent, but a year-end resurgence of inflation
induced the NAP to rescind the reduction in February 1995 (since
inflation seemed to be calming down, the cut was reinstated two
months later).
The simultaneous enforcement of a slow crawl and a high
nominal interest policy created the danger of destabilizing
speculation. Once again it became attractive to switch from dollars
to zloty accounts and back to dollars. Aware of this danger the NAP
announced, on May 15 1995, a major policy shift. Henceforth the
zloty would be permitted to fluctuate within the upper and lower
crawling limits set by the NAP. The system is a variant of the
familiar "snake in the tunnel". The floor and ceiling values
provide an indication of the points at which the central banking
authorities are ready to interfere. The behavior of the zloty
would, in turn, provide a signal for the setting of the rate of
"crawl". The new system is yet to pass the test of time, but the
first indications are that the rate of foreign exchange inflow has
diminished, and the inflation is subsiding. Thus, after a "crawling
peg" detour, Poland may be moving to monetary stability that was
sought by the 1990 reformers.
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3. Foreign trade
Trade Under the Communist Regime
As in all the Soviet Bloc countries, Poland's trade under the
communist regime was a state monopoly. Exports and imports were
strictly subordinated to the plan and the direction and composition
of trade were determined as much by political as by economic
considerations. The trade was carried out under three different
regimes. The highest priority was given to trade with the Council
of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, for short) partners conducted
in so-called "transferable rubles". Most of the trade with the
"West" was conducted in terms of convertible currencies. There were
special barter agreements, mainly with developing countries.
Stalinism in Poland was a period of virtual economic
isolation. In the 1960s, however, imports expanded faster than
"national income produced"; exports grew, too, albeit at a slower
rate 17. Between 1970 and 1978 imports were further boosted by
modernization drive which called for the acquisition of Western
technology and of Western capital goods18. , undertaken under the
leadership of Edward Gierek, then First Secretary of the PZPR. In
17
. Though "national income produced" in the soviet-type
economies differs from GDP, the intertemporal movements of the two
series are closely correlated.
18
. The modernization drive was masterminded by Edward Gierek,
the then First Secretary of PZPR.
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1978, burdened with foreign debt, and unable to obtain further
loans, the government was forced to reduce imports and expand
exports (Table 2).
The attempt at austerity added fuel to political discontent,
leading to the rise of "Solidarity" (1980-1981). The imposition of
martial law on November 12/13 , 1981 permitted the government to
renew its retrenchment efforts resulting in a sharp fall in income
and an even sharper fall in imports.
Table 3
Indexes of "national income produced", imports and exports



































After reaching a nadir in 1982, the Polish economy recovered,
though in 1988, the penultimate year of communist rule, the
"national income produced" was still slightly below the 1978 peak.
In 1988 imports were, however 4 per cent higher, and exports 32 per
cent higher than ten years earlier.
15
The modernization drive of the 1970s marked the beginning of
reorientation of trade away from CMEA. Western machinery purchased
with Western credits required Western inputs which had to be paid
for with hard currency earned by exporting. When, in the 1980s the
regime attempted to inject market elements into the decision-making
process, Western orientation became even more apparent. In 1981-
1982 the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were granted a degree of
marketing autonomy. On October 30, 1988, the Council of Minister
approved the introduction of a non-discriminatory structure of
customs duties, patterned, broadly speaking, after the tariff
schedules of semi-industrialized countries19. Trade monopolies were
abolished by an ordinance of December 23, 1988 which became law in
January 1989. Though in practice political considerations continued
to play a key role, in practice the proportion of Polish exports to
the CMEA countries declined from 64 per cent in 1970 to 54 per
cent in 1982 and to 41 per cent in 1988, the last full year of
communist rule.20
The 1990 trade liberalization
January 1, 1990 saw the elimination of virtually all
quantitative trade barriers. Polish enterprises were free to import
and to export on their own account without obtaining permits. There
19
 Raw materials were exempt from duties, or subject to a low
rate; finished products were more heavily protected. The unweighted




were only three exceptions to this rule: first, the reexport of raw
materials imported from other CMEA countries (mainly from Russia)
at lower-than-world prices was prohibited; second, coal exports
were subject to quota restrictions (the domestic price of certain
grades of coal continued to be maintained below the world price
levels)21 and thirdly, Poland had to abide by import quotas set by
Western Europe and by the United States on Polish textiles, steel
and several other products.
The goal was to achieve trade balance for the year 1990 as a
whole. Liberalization was expected to result in a rapid rise in
imports and a more gradual expansion of exports. The current
account would be in deficit during the first half of the year, but
this deficit would be compensated by a surplus accumulated in the
course of the next six months.
Much as expected consumers took advantage of liberalization to
built up a stock of hitherto unavailable durables. But as the
household stocks of durables rose, purchases declined. The
undervaluation of the zloty, kept purchases of imported consumer
durables in check. With the passing of socialism, there was also
increasing anxiety about job security, and this, too, reduced
demand for imported consumer durables. As the economy went into
recession, imports of producer goods also declined. The domestic
21
. The re-export provisions lapsed with the dissolution of the
CMEA.
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slump and the undervaluation of the zloty spurred exports. The
trade balance turned positive as early as February 1990 leading, as
mentioned earlier, to an undesired rise in foreign exchange
reserves22
To slow down the accumulation of reserves about 2/3 of all
customs duties were reduced or suspended. The unweighted tariff
average declined from 11.7 per cent to 5. 8 per cent, and the trade-
weighted average from 11.4 per cent to 5.8 pre cent. In mid-1990
Poland came to enjoy a remarkable degree of free trade23.
The return to protectionism
The mid-1991 to mid-1993 period was marked by relative trade
stagnation and by a return to protectionism. The two phenomena were
doubtless connected, but in each exogenous factors played a key
role. The stagnation of trade reflected, to a large extent, the
West European economic slump. The return to protectionism - the
victory of dirigiste political elements.24
22
. The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves was unwanted
first, because of its inflationary effects, and secondly, because
Poland had just entered into negotiations with its creditors. The
rapid rise in reserves was harmful to Poland's claim that the
country was not able to meet its debt obligations.
23
. See Nogaj (1992)
24
. Poland is not the only post-communist country to retreat
from trade liberalism. A general discussion of the issues involved
will be found in Messerlin (1994). For a comparative study of
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, see Gacs
(1994).
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Though trade liberalization was at the heart of the 1990
reforms, the customs duty reductions and suspensions were looked
upon as interim measures. There was need for a complete revision of
the tariff system inherited from the communist regime. The number
of tariff brackets was confusingly large. Similar products often
fell into different tariff categories complicating clearance
procedures and encouraging customs fraud and bribery. The duty on
some intermediates was higher than that on the final products. The
nomenclature was idiosyncratic and not readily translatable into
the standard international system.
The revision process, which began in 1991, soon revealed a
clash of conceptions and of interests. Technical advisors to the
government favored the sweeping away of all protective measures,
except for a revenue tariff. To minimize tariff-induced
distortions, they proposed imposing a broad-based flat 10 per cent
duty to which there would be few or no exceptions.
The free traders found themselves in opposition to a broad
array of specific interests of which the farmers were the most
powerful. Paradoxical as it may seem, Poland's small private
farmers fared well under communism. Under a policy instituted in
the 1970s and in the 1980s agricultural inputs were available at
stable, subsidized prices, and the home market was tightly
protected. For the peasants the last years of communist rule
brought exceptional prosperity. The average income of members of
19
peasant households surpassed that of workers' households by 16 per
cent in 1987, by 23 per cent in 1988 and by 16 per cent in 198925.
The 1990 reforms brought hardship to the farmers. Agricultural
subsidies declined from 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 1 per cent
in 1990. The freeing of all consumer goods' prices, and the opening
up of the home market to competition from better quality foreign
dairy products, fruits and meats spelled a precipitous decline in
the farmers' terms of trade. While the first years of
transformation affected virtually all strata of society, farmers
fared especially badly. The average farm income fell by 1991, to 84
per cent of the average income of the non-agricultural workers'
households. The decline in fortunes led the farmers to organize a
vigorous campaign for the restoration of the lost privileges,
including demands for protection, and for duty-free importation of
agricultural inputs, such as protein-rich fodder and machines which
were not produced in Poland.
Powerful manufacturing interests also sought special favors.
Poland has a comparative advantage in basic products; on the other
hand, highly fabricated technologically-intensive products compete
with foreign products with difficulty. The manufacturing sector
favored a tariff structure in which the rates increase steeply with
the degree of fabrication. Such a structure also found favor among
government policy makers interested in fostering "high tech"
25
 Dabrowski and Kwiecinski (1994)
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industries. Paradoxically, even the Ministry of Cooperation with
Foreign Countries pressed for higher tariffs. Poland had just
entered into talks with the European Economic Community (EEC) and
with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, and it wanted
to participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Uruguay Round. What could it give away in exchange for foreign
concessions if its tariffs were already low?
Fiscal stringency was yet another factor that tilted the scale
in favor of protectionism. In 1991 it became evident that all
possible sources of revenue had to be tapped to keep the fiscal
deficit down to an acceptable level - an argument which was used by
advocates of high duty rates on "luxury" goods the demand for which
is presumed to be highly inelastic.
The protectionists won a clear victory. With the August 1,
1991 introduction of the new tariff schedule, the unweighted
average of tariffs rose from 5.82 per cent to 16.83 per cent, and
the weighted average from 5.4 9 per cent to 14.2 7 per cent.26 The
new schedule comprised nine customs duty brackets, the lowest two
(0 per cent and 5 per cent) applied to raw materials, and the
highest (ranging from 35 per cent to 45 per cent and over) to
highly sophisticated and "luxury" products. Most of the semi-
fabricates were subject to a 15 per cent, and most of the finished
26
. These figures take into account temporary reductions and
suspensions.
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industrial products to a 30 per cent duty. A separate schedule
applied to automobiles. Polish cars, inexpensive but inefficient,
competed with used foreign-made cars rather than with the (much
more expensive) new foreign cars. To protect the Polish car
industry the tariff on used car imports was set at a higher level
than on new cars, with the duty rate rising with the age of the
car. Importation of cars more than 10 years old was prohibited.
Table 4
Import tariff rates prior to and after the August l, 1991 tariff
reform
before 1.8. 1991 since 1.8.1991
Unweighted averages: (in per cent)
Nominal rates 11.7 17.0
Actual rates* 5.8 16.8
Weighted average:
Nominal rates 3.4 16.2
Actual rates* 5.5 14.3
* Taking into account temporary tariff reductions and suspensions.
Source: Nogaj (1992) p. 65.
Farmers scored the greatest victory. Even before the general
tariff revision they were granted special favors. Now they obtained
higher protection than industry (Table 5). The next four years saw
the banning of some food imports (e.g. of chicken thighs and legs),
the introduction of seasonally varying tariffs and of
"compensatory" tariffs equalizing the cost of selected
agricultural imports with domestic reference prices.
22
Table 5
Actual industrial and agricultural average weighted tariff rates
1993 and 1994#
before 31.12.1993 since 1.1.1994
(in per cent)
Agricultural products 18.5 18.3
Industrial products 10.7 10.7
All products 11.7 11.6
# Exclusive of the 6% "border tax11 levied on all imports.
Source: Press release of the Ministry for Foreign Cooperation
reported by Nogaj (1994)
The new tariff schedule represented a compromise between the
protection-seeking home producers and the purchasers of their
products. Not surprisingly, a differentiated tariff could not
satisfy everybody. A commission for tariff revision, formed in
September 1992, considered 1300 petitions for change of which it
accepted 3 0027 Most of the changes involved greater tariff rate
differentiation, but they had no significant effect on the average
rate of protection (Table 5)
At the new, higher tariff rates imports generated more
government revenue, but, in view of the persisting deficit, the
government imposed an additional 6 per cent tax on the value of
all imports, inclusive of customs duties. On July 5, 1993 this tax
was converted into a 6 per cent customs duty. The duty was
27
. Nogaj (1994) loc. cit.
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calculated on the value of imports, inclusive of all other duties
and taxes, such as the newly introduced Value Added Tax, and the
excise taxes applicable to certain commodities, e.g. alcohol and
tobacco. The duty remained in force in 1994; it was lowered to 5
per cent in 1955, and, fiscal conditions permitting, it is to be
gradually phased out. The problem was that, under very optimistic
assumptions, the 1995 fiscal deficit would amount to 10.7 per cent
of the fiscal revenues, and to 3.3 per cent of the GNP. The budget
projections assumed that the 5 per cent tax would contribute 3 per
cent, and all customs duties and taxes 9.7 per cent of all fiscal
revenues. To wean the government from dependence on import tax
revenue would be a problem.
With the retreat from liberalism, trade policy came to be seen
more and more as a tool of industrial policy28. The first measures
were modest in scope. In order to help the leather industry which
was hurt by a rise in rawhide prices, the government raised in 1992
the turnover tax levied on rawhide exports from 20 per cent to 50
per cent, and, a year later it suspended import duties on rawhides.
In mid-1993, the scope of ad-hoc measures was greatly expanded.
Customs duties which were levied on a long list of products
"needed for the reconstruction of the national economy11 were
reduced or suspended29. The list included raw materials such as
non-ferrous ores and concentrates, machinery (large tractors which
28
. See Nogaj (1994a), 73-86
29
. Dziennik Ustaw 1993, no. 53 item 245
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were not produced in Poland, gas turbines and textile machinery)
The newly-established auto assembly industry obtained a duty-free
component import quota; the electronic industry obtained a similar
privilege, as did a number of other industries, including some,
such as the silk industry, most unlikely to survive foreign
competition. A duty-free quota was set for products needed by the
military and the police. A quota was also set for duty-free
importation of equipment and of vehicles needed for oil and gas
prospecting. A somewhat longer list of temporary reductions and
suspensions applied in 199430 In the same year the government
created a sugar producers' cartel. A tax was imposed on domestic
sugar sales; the proceeds of this tax were to be used to subsidize
exports needed to dispose of the sugar surplus created by the
artificially high domestic sugar prices.
Quantitative export restrictions also reappeared. Poland
exports steel; it also exports scrap iron and steel, utilized in
steel - making. Exports of scrap in 1991 amounted to 1600 tons and
in 1992 to 1300 tons. But in 1993, under pressure from the Polish
steel industry a 600 ton limit was placed on scrap exports. In the
course of the year the exporters were granted additional quotas,
and total exports reached 1011.7 thousand tons. Despite the quota
expansion, toward the end of 1993, the price of scrap in Germany
was twice as high as in Poland. Not content with this result, the
30
. Dziennik Ustaw 1993, no. 128 item 592
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steel interests pressured the government to reduce the 1994 scrap
export quota to 400 tons31.
The trend toward quantitative trade restrictions is spreading:
with increasing frequency such restrictions are built into joint
venture agreements, while many new contracts with foreign firms
(e.g. in telecommunications) contain a domestic content provision.
Change in the direction of trade
The transition years (1990 - 1993) witnessed a striking
reorientation of the direction of trade. As we saw earlier CMEA
accounted for over 40 per cent of Poland's trade (exports plus
imports) in 1988; in 1990 for only 25 per cent. The CMEA was
dissolved in 1991. The dissolution was followed by transition
difficulties in the former USSR, CMEA's dominant partner. By 1993
Eastern Europe accounted for less than 14 per cent of Poland's
trade whereas 71 per cent was with the EEC and with EFTA.
Gradually, however, normal links with Russia and the Ukraine are
being reestablished: preliminary figures for 1994 show that
Poland's trade with its Eastern partners is gaining in importance.
Trade agreements
The 1990 Balcerowicz reforms had one overriding goal:
integration of Poland in the world economy. Poland opened up its
markets, and it sought access to markets for Polish goods. To this
31Woklodkiewicz-Donimirski (1994) .
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effect it undertook negotiations with GATT, with the European
Economic Community, and with EFTA. Together with Hungary and
Czechoslovakia it formed a Central European Free Trade Area (known
as CEFTA or as the Visegrad Group).
Despite Poland's retreat from free trade these efforts did
not flag in subseguent years. The goals changed, however. The
negotiations took on a "strategic" character. Poland sought to
obtain better access to foreign markets It was willing, albeit
reluctantly to reduce its trade barriers in exchange for
concessions.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Poland joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
1967, and obtained the status of a Most Favored Nation. In exchange
for admission to the GATT, the candidate countries are usually
asked to lower their tariffs. But tariff concessions are
meaningless in the case of centrally planned economies. In lieu of
such concessions Poland agreed in the Act of Accession to increase
its imports from GATT member countries at a 7 per cent annual rate.
This pledge was not honored from the mid-1970s on.
The implementation of the Balcerowicz reforms called for a
redefinition of conditions of GATT membership. In November 1993
Poland joined the "Uruguay Round" of talks. Along with all other
countries Poland submitted a schedule of base rate duties which
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were to serve as a starting point for negotiations on multilateral
reductions.
In the course of the negotiations Poland agreed to reduce by
the year 2000 the average level of tariffs on industrial goods by
40 per cent and on agricultural goods respectively by 35 per cent,
relative to a base level. It also pledged to "bind" 96 per cent of
the eight-digit industrial import categories32 and all the
agricultural import categories on the new, lower level." Poland
also agreed to reduce the average mean support (AMS) provided to
domestic agriculture by 2 0 per cent34, and to cut export subsidies
by 36 per cent, and to refrain from imposing new quantitative
import restraints. The "concessions" are of the same order of
magnitude as those made by highly industrial countries, but in the
case of Poland they overstate the degree of promised
liberalization, especially as what concerns agriculture. Thus in
1990-1993 the AMS of Polish agriculture was approximately 40 per
cent lower than in 1986-1988, the period used as a basis for the
Uruguay Round reduction. As a consequence Poland nay raise the
degree of support, and yet adhere to its Uruguay Round schedule of
32
. Automobile tariffs are the most important exception.
33
 "Binding" implies an undertaking to refrain from future
increase in the scheduled tariffs, except in specific circumstances
enumerated in the protocol of the agreement.
34
. The AMS is calculated as follows:
AMS = Q(P-P*) + S
where Q= quantity produced, P = domestic price, P* = import or
export price and S = direct subsidy.
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"cuts". The same holds for the export subsidies, most of which
(sugar and powder milk being the only major exceptions) were swept
away in 1990. Note, however, that a similar comment applies to
Uruguay commitments of most of the developing, and of some of the
highly developed countries35.
The Treaty of Association with the European Economic Community
On October 16, 1991 Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary,
signed a Treaty of Association with the European Economic
Community36. The Treaty calls for the harmonization of trade
practices and for the establishment of free trade in industrial
products. It also outlines the conditions which the three (now
four) countries have to meet to qualify for full membership,
without specifying, however, the time period within which such
membership may be granted. Pending the completion of the
ratification process, an Interim Agreement came into force on Mach
1, 1992 and the Agreement itself on February 1, 1994.
35
. For the highly developed countries as a group the tariffs
prior to the Uruguay round tariffs were "bound" at 6.0 per cent
trade-weighed average. The actual average was equal to 5.0 per
cent. After reduction the tariffs were bound at 5.0 per cent on the
average. In the case of the United States and of the European
Economic Community the actual protection rates are the same as the
base period rates, but in the case of Australia the averages are
20.1 per cent, 10.0 per cent, and 12.2 per cent respectively. See
Kirmani (1994)
36
. The 1991 Treaty supplanted and enlarged an agreement for
trade cooperation concluded in 1989 by Poland and the EEC.
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Under the Treaty the EEC agreed to eliminate (between 1992 and
1996) all barriers limiting the importation of Polish industrial
products. 37 All quotas on industrial products, other than those
limiting the entry of coal, iron and steel, and textiles were
eliminated by the end of 1994. Full liberalization of import of
products which are covered by the European Coal and Steel Community
is to be accomplished by the end of 1995, and the removal of quotas
on textile and clothing by the beginning of 1998.
Poland, as the "weaker partner" was given ten years to
eliminate all trade barriers against industrial imports from the
Community. The liberalization of imports of raw materials and of
capital goods in 1992 was a first step. All other restrictions,
except those applying to automobiles, are to be removed in a phased
manner during 1995 - 1999. A duty-free automobile import quota,
established in 1992, is to be increased by 5 per cent per year
between 1994 and 2002, by which year all restrictions (including
the prohibition of importation of cars more than 10 years old) are
to be removed.
Both sides may reimpose import restrictions under conditions
specified by the GATT. Poland is also permitted to take protective
measures if imports from the EEC endanger its infant industries,
industries in the process of transformation, and those that
37
 For the purpose of satisfying the EEC domestic content
clause Poland, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia (later the Czech and the
Slovak Republics) are treated as one country.
30
encounter serious economic or social problems. Poland may also
grant special protection to EEC enterprises located in Poland. Thus
Poland is free to pursue an independent "industrial policy",
during the transformation period.
The Treaty does not call for the establishment of a free
market in agricultural goods. However, Poland gave the EEC
exporters a 10 percentage points customs tariff preference on 246
agricultural products, while the EEC undertook to enlarge its
import quotas. Both sides retain the right to conduct an
independent agricultural protection policy.
Poland-EFTA treaty
On November 15, 1993 Poland and the member countries of the
European Free Trade Agreement concluded a treaty the provisions of
which matched closely those of the Poland-EEC agreement. As in the
latter arrangements, restrictions against Polish products were to
be lifted more rapidly than those imposed by Poland. Since EFTA
countries did not pursue a common agricultural policy, partial
liberalization of trade in agricultural goods was covered by
bilateral treaties.
The "Visegrad Group"
Under the "Visegrad Agreement", signed on December 21, 1992,
Poland. Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary agreed to form the Central
European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), a common market in industrial
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products. The implementation schedule called for a drastic
reduction of barriers during the first five year period; the entire
process was to be completed by the year 2 001.
The agreement, however, has purely symbolic significance. In
recent years Czecho-Slovakia accounted for less than 4 per cent of
Poland's foreign trade, and Hungary for about 1 per cent. The three
countries are to become gradually integrated in the broader
European community hence CEFTA will, at most, have a marginal
impact on the direction of trade.
4. Foreign debt.
In 1989, when the "Solidarity"-led government came into power
Poland was unable to meet its foreign financial obligations.
Though the country was in default, its program to restore democracy
and free enterprise found favor in the West. Poland was offered aid
and support of the IMF and of the World Bank. Yet a settlement of
the debt issue was an essential prelude to full access to
international financial markets. Negotiations with the creditors
pre-date the "Solidarity" takeover; they were resumed by the
"Solidarity" regime but the final settlement was not reached until
1994.
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The genesis of the debt crisis38
Poland's foreign debt problem dates to the 1970s. The
communist regime, threatened by popular revolt, attempted
simultaneously to increase the availability of consumer goods and
to lay the foundations of future prosperity through the
modernization of the economy. Foreign borrowing was to be the key
to this strategy. Foreign credit was to be used to finance the
purchase of Western technology and of Western equipment. Given the
expected improvement in productivity, loan repayment would be no
problem.
The ambitious program resulted in a rise of indebtedness from
$200 million in 1970 to $12 billion in 1976. About 15 per cent of
the loan proceeds were used for consumer goods imports and the
availability of such goods was the one visible benefit of the
program. 20 per cent of the credits were utilized to re-tool the
economy (foreign credits financed nearly 25 per cent of gross
investment). There was little improvement in productivity because
of misdirection of investment and of the misuse of the new
equipment . The utilization of the new equipment required the use
of Western raw materials and semifabricates; 65 per cent of the
loan money went for such imports.
38
. This section draws heavily on "Ciezar starych dlugow" (the
burden of old debt) Nowa Europa November 19-21, 1994.
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As the debt mounted, the government found it increasingly
difficult to borrow new money and to refinance old loans. Interest
rates rose and the repayment periods shrank. As early as 1977,
Poland had trouble meeting its Western obligations. Attempts to
rein in the economy precipitated a sharp recession and fuelled
popular discontent but they did not solve the problem. In 1980,
the year in which the "Solidarity" movement almost succeeded in
toppling the regime, the convertible currency debt surpassed $24
billion, and debt service payments amounted to 96 per of total
exports to the convertible currency countries™ . About 70 per
cent of the debt was to become due for repayment between 1981 and
1983. The creditors recognized the fact that the repayment of $17
billion far surpassed the country's capability. In April 1981,
Poland reached an agreement with the "Paris Club" (the lender
governments) delaying, till 1986-1989, 90 per cent of the payments
on account of capital and of accumulated interest on long and
medium-term loans. Negotiations were started toward a comprehensive
debt restructuring agreement but these were interrupted when the
government declared a "state of war" suspending civil liberties and
jailing "Solidarity" leaders. As a consequence of this declaration,
Poland was cut off from obtaining credits which were guaranteed by
foreign governments. Negotiations which were also initiated with
the "London Club"(the commercial lenders) prior to the "state of
war", ultimately led to a rescheduling of repayment of 95% of the
principal although Poland continued to be responsible for meeting
39
 World Bank (1987), p. 5
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its interest payment obligations. Poland also obtained access to
short-term, revolving credits.
Negotiations with both "clubs" resumed in 1984 and led to a
series of piecemeal arrangements which gave temporary relief.
Nevertheless, Poland was constantly in arrears on payments of its
obligations and the country continued to be cut off from
contracting new foreign-government guaranteed loans. The foreign
debt kept mounting. During the 1980s Poland failed to meet two
thirds of its interest obligations. In 1989 the value of the debt
surpassed 500 per cent of the annual value of exports. The debt to
Western creditors (including capitalized unpaid interest) amounted
to $40.8 billion of which close to 70 per cent was due to the Paris
Club. In addition, Poland owed 7 billion "convertible" rubles to
its former COMECON partners.
Agreement with the "Paris Club"
The advent of the Solidarity-led government brought much-
needed debt relief. As early as October 1989, the "London Club"
members agreed to delay the repayment of the principal and 85 per
cent of interest payments due in the fourth quarter of the year.
Following the adoption of the IMF-backed liberalization-cum-
stabilization program, the "Paris Club" granted Poland a payments
moratorium till the end of March, 1991. Negotiations aiming at a
comprehensive solution were also resumed.
35
The April 1991 agreement, between Poland and the 17 "Paris
Club" members involved a scaling down of the principal,
recapitalization, and the rescheduling of payments. The program was
to be implemented in two phases. The first phase (April 1, 1991-
March 31, 1994) coincided in time with stabilization agreement
reached between Poland and the International Monetary Fund.
Poland's payments of interest on the loans outstanding were reduced
by 80 per cent. The overall net present value of the debt (due
account being taken of the interest payment reduction) was cut by
30 per cent. Under the second phase, the net present value of the
debt was to be reduced by another 2 0 per cent of the initial
amount. The implementation of the second phase was to be contingent
upon three conditions: first, the government was to adhere to an
IMF-approved stabilization program; second, government would meet
the (reduced) debt servicing obligations; finally, no agreements
would be concluded giving other creditors more favorable treatment
than was given to the Paris club members.411
The first two conditions were readily met. Negotiations with
the commercial lenders (the London Club) took four years; an
agreement fulfilling the third condition was signed on October 27,
1994.
40
. Ministry of Finance press release
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Reduction and conversion of the "London Club" obligations.
In the Fall of 1994 Poland reached an agreement with the
"London Club" resulting in the scaling down of Poland's $14.39
billion commercial debt by 49.2 per cent.41 $870 million in
overdue interest payments was cancelled outright; the Polish
government agreed to a buyback of $3,250 million of its debt at a
cost of $1,324.6 million42 and $10.27 billion of the old debt was
converted into a new debt instrument with a nominal value of $7.98
million. The operation called for an immediate outlay of $1,324.6
million43, a major part of which was covered by the IMF, the World
Bank, and the reserves of the National Bank of Poland44.
The cost of debt service under the agreements to rise
gradually from $400 million in 1995 to $ 600 million by the turn of
the century. The entire debt is to be repaid by the year 2024, and
41The agreement with the "London Club" was signed on September
14, 1994 and it came into force on October 27 of the same year.
Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion that follows is based on
Ministry of Finance press releases.
42
. $2.93 billion of the debt was to be bought back at 41
cents to the dollar and $320 million at 31 cents to the dollar.
43
. Of this sum $1,324.6 million was needed for the debt
buyback, and $623 million for the purchase of U.S. treasury
obligations. These were deposited with the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to be used (at the end of 3 0 years) to repurchase $4.8
billion of the new obligations.
44
. The loans advanced by the IMF and by the World Bank
amounted, respectively, to $900 million and $400 million , while
$440 million came out of the reserves of the National Bank of
Poland. $137.7 million was obtained under the "new money agreement"
and $70 was provided within the 1994 budget.
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the average payment the entire 30 year period amounts to $561.7
million.
The reduction agreements notwithstanding Poland continues to
bear a heavy burden of external debt. According to the Ministry of
Finance Poland owed foreign creditors $47.5 billion as of
September 30, 1994. Of this amount $27.1 billion (57 per cent) was
owed to the Paris Club, $14.2 billion (30 per cent) to the London
Club $2.4 billion (5 per cent) to the former USSR and other COMECON
countries45, and the balance consisted of other government-
guaranteed and short-term loans. In 1995 and 1996 however the
total cost of debt servicing will only amount to $1.5 - $1.6
billion per year; if no additional debt is contracted, the cost
will rise to $2.3 billion in 2000, $2.9 billion in 2002, and $3.5
billion in 200446 The payments - even under the assumption of
moderate rate of growth - should be well within the country's
capability.
45
. The COMECON debt issue was subsequently settled through
multilateral negotiations and the cancellation of mutual debts.
46
 "Strategia dla eksportu11 Rzeczpospolita Nov. 23, 1994, based
on Urszula Plowiec, "Sprostac wyznaniom konkurencyjnosci" [match
competition] a paper presented at a Central Planning Office
conference held on November 18, 1994.
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5. Direct Foreign Investment
DFI under the communist regime
Prior to World War II foreign capital played a major role in
Poland's industrialization47. However, following the communist
take-over the government nationalized all privately-owned
(including foreign) means of production48 and barred new direct
foreign investment.
A small chink in the anti-DFI armor was made in 1976 with the
adoption of a Council of Ministers' Regulation concerning the
licensing of foreign and Polish-foreign partnerships49. The
conditions were, however, far from benign. The Regulation was,
technically speaking, not a law and it could be amended or repealed
at any time. The tax system was unclear and it was administered in
a highly arbitrary fashion. The licenses were issued at the
pleasure of the authorities, and the rights of the licensees were
severely circumscribed. The partnerships were required to deposit
47
. See Wellisz, L. (1938)
48
. Rural smallholdings were an exception. Large holdings were
broken up into smaller parcels, some (especially in former German-
owned territories) were collectivized.
49
. Rozporzadzenie Rady Ministrow w sprawie wydawania
zagranicznym osobom prawnym i fizycznym zezwolen na prowadzenie
niektorych rodzajow dzialalnosci gospodarczej (Regulation of the
Council of Ministers concerning the licensing of foreign physical
and legal persons to engage in certain types of economic activity)
Dziennik Ustaw of 1976, no. 19 item 128
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30 per cent of the proposed investment in a no-interest bearing
account in a Polish bank and they were barred from receiving credit
from Polish banks. The annual rate of profit repatriation was not
to exceed 9 per cent of the foreign capital investment plus 50 per
cent of the net surplus of direct exports over direct imports50.
A series of modest measures adopted in the course of the next
decade made foreign investment somewhat more welcome. In July 1982
Parliament turned the 1976 Regulation into a Law51 thus giving a
modicum of security to DFI, though retaining all the restrictive
rules. The latter were gradually relaxed. However, during the
decade following the introduction of the Regulation licenses were
granted only to very small firms formed with the participation of
expatriate Polish capital (so-called "Polonia" firms) and the total
volume of investment was insignificant.
The first comprehensive foreign investment law, adopted by
Parliament on April 23, 1986s2, swept away all previous
regulations. No new licenses were to be issued under the 1982 Law
50
. For a discussion of private foreign investment prior to
1990, see Breitkopf (1950) .
51
. Ustawa o zasadach prowadzenia na terytorium Polskiej
Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej dzialalnosci gospodarczej w zakresie
drobnej wytworczosci przez zagraniczne osoby prawne i fizyczne ( A
Law on the Principles of Conducting Business on the Territory of
the Polish People's Republic by Foreign Physical and Legal persons)
Dziennik Ustaw, 1982 no. 19, item 146.
52
. Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1986 roku o spolkach z udzialem
zagranicznym (The law of 23 April 1986 on Companies with foreign
participation) Dziennik Ustaw. 1986 no. 17 item 88.
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(most of the licenses were to expire in 2,000 or in 2,010). Foreign
investors gained permission to acquire minority interest in joint
stock or limited liability companies. The Law put some restrictions
on the fields of activity open to foreigners and on profit
repatriation but these were eased toward the end of 1988 53
Despite the gradual relaxation of restrictions the volume of
foreign investment remained very low till the very end of the
communist regime. Total DFI as of the end of 1988 was variously
estimated at between $70 and $130 million54 According to
Breitkopf in 1989 firms with direct foreign participation employed
130,000 workers; of these some 100,000 workers were employed by
about 700 "Polonia" firms,35 while 30,000 worked in the fifty-odd
firms licensed under the 1982 law56 Enterprises with foreign
participation thus gave employment to 0.7 per cent of the 17.5
53
. Ustawa z dnia 22 grudnia 1988 roku o prowadzeniu
dzialalnosci z udzialem podmiotow zagranicznych (the Law on
economic activities in which foreign enterprises participate)
Dziennik Ustaw 1988 no. 41 item 325
54
. The low estimate is given by Stanislaw Kubielas (1994a)
Breitkopf (1990) gives the high estimate.
55
. Breitkopf (1990) states that there were 727 "Polonia11
firms; Kubielas(1994a) puts their number at 688. The ephemeral
nature of many of such firms and reporting inaccuracies account for
the differences in estimates.
56
. According to Breitkopf (1990) a total of 52 permits were
issued under the 1982 Law; Kubielas (1994) states that 53
enterprises thus licensed operated in 1989.
41
million labor force, and they accounted for 1.6 per cent of the
value of total sales, and 3.0 per cent of total exports57.
1989, the year of transition from a communist to a
nSolidarity"-led government, brought further liberalization. The
most important measure was the removal of the ceiling imposed on
foreign participation. The licenses issued in one year rose to
over 8OO58 — seventeen times the number in the previous two years.
214 of these actually became operational"19. The liberalization of
the foreign exchange law (December 1990) and the law on
privatization (1990) further encouraged DFI.
DFI since the introduction of the Balcerowicz reforms.60
Since the introduction of the Balcerowicz reforms, the legal
framework for the functioning of enterprises with direct foreign
participation has been defined by the Polish Commercial Code of
1934 (as later amended) and by the 1991 Law on Corporations with
Foreign Participation61.
57
. Estimates based on GUS data are given in Breikopf (1990) .
58





. The following section is based primarily on Instytut
Koniunktur i Cen Handlu Zagranicznego (1994)
61
. Ustawa o spolkach z udzialem zagranicznym, Dziennik Ustaw.
1991 no. 61 item 253.
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Foreign enterprises are required to establish a Polish legal
entity to do business in Poland. Exception is made for foreign
trade, transport, tourism and cultural services in which foreign
firms are permitted to operate directly. Under the 1991 Law foreign
investors may invest in corporations and in limited liability
companies and they may hold up to 100 per cent of the equity. The
Ministry of Finance stands ready to issue, at the request of the
foreign firm, a guarantee against loss resulting from expropriation
or from similar action.
Foreign investment may take the form of a new enterprise
("greenfield investment") or a joint venture with an existing
private or public sector Polish enterprise or finally the
acquisition of shares in an enterprise that is being privatized62
All foreign persons, whether physical or legal, are required to
obtain a government license to acquire real estate. The procedure
is complex63, and it may be costly and lengthy, thus reducing the
attractiveness of "greenfield investment". Permission is also
required to form a joint venture with a State Owned Enterprise.
A government license (issued by the Ministry of Ownership
Transformation) is needed to engage in the management of harbors
and of airfields, real estate brokerage, defence industry,
62
. An investor (whether Polish or foreign) who wants to
acquire through the stock market more than a 10 per cent holding in
any enterprise is required to make public his intentions.
63
. See Taradejna (1991)
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wholesale trade imported consumer goods and in the provision of
legal services.64 A license is also required in cases where the
Polish partner in a joint venture is a government - owned
corporation, and where that Polish partner's contribution to the
joint venture consists of capital in kind65. Finally, the
permission of the NAP is necessary for establishing a bank with
foreign participation. At least one of the directors has to be a
Polish citizen. Foreign investors may participate in Polish
insurance companies, provided foreign investment amount to at least
50 per cent of the reserve requirements. Note that foreign
insurance companies are not permitted to open branches in Poland
until 1999.
Taxation of foreign investment
Under the 1991 Law foreign investments exceeding 2 million
Ecu could be granted tax exempt status for specified time periods
if they satisfied any one of the following conditions: (i) the
investment was located in an area of structural unemployment;
(ii) the investment brought in new technology; (iii) exports
amounted to 20 per cent or more of the production.
M
.The Ministry must communicate its decision within two
months of the filing for a license.
65
. No license is needed if the Polish partner is a fully-
government-owned corporation.
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Tax relief was granted by the Ministry of Finance on a
discretionary basis, creating numerous conflicts and suspicion of
corruption. Effective January 1994, the special internal privileges
were abolished and all firms, regardless of the origin of capital,
are now subject to the same tax laws.66 However, the machinery and
equipment paid for by the foreign partners can be imported duty-
free during the first three years of a firm's existence. Foreign
employees are subject to a 2 0 per cent income tax (or a tax
specified in a bilateral tax treaty) and they may repatriate their
earnings.
The scope and role of direct foreign investment.
Since the collapse of the communist regime the volume of DFI
has rapidly increased, its annual inflow having risen from $20
million in 1989 to a peak of $1.5 billion in 1993 (the inflow
declined slightly in 1994), and the stock having risen from under
$70 million in December, 1989 to over $4 billion in September 1994
66
. At present profits are subject to a 40 per cent tax; in
addition, dividend are taxed at a 20 per cent rate. The tax on
dividends may be reduced in accordance with bilateral treaties to
eliminate double taxation concluded between Poland and its major
trading partners.
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(Table 6)67. In 1994 there was a slight decline in the rate of
inflow, but by year-end the total DFI surpassed $4.3 billion68
Table 6


































(a) 1990 -1993 as of December 31; 1994 - as of September 30.
Source: Foreign Trade Research Institute, Foreign Investment in
Poland (various issues) cited in Kubielas, et. al. (1994)
As Table 6 shows, the size of the average investment in 1989
was under $100,000. Liberalization brought a flood of small - scale
Polish expatriate capital. Larger investors came to play a more
important role in subsequent years. Though the average size of the
foreign holding was still under $400,000 in December 1993,
investments of $1 million or over amounted to $2,828 million thus
67
. The PAIZ (the Polish State Agency for Foreign Investment)
figures are among the highest of the various estimates of DFI. For
a comprehensive discussion of the data issue, see the Economic
Bulletin for Europe (1994).
68
. According to PAIZ investments of $1 million or over
amounted to a total of $4,080 million by November 1994. Therefore,
investments under $ 1 million amounted to $200 to $400 million.
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accounting for over 90 per cent of the total.69 A major share of
foreign investment was located in joint ventures. Typically,
foreign investors would initially take a minority share and then
enlarge their holdings to assume control. Thus, between 1990 and
1993, the share of foreign holding in joint ventures rose from 40.7
per cent to 72.8 per cent.70 Industry accounts for 75 per cent of
cumulative DFI, and trade for 12 per cent.
How big a role does DFI play in the Polish economy? According
to GUS aggregate direct foreign investment accounted for 3.3
percent of all corporate equity capital, as of December 31 1993,
and firms with foreign participation for 5.1 per cent71. Such
firms employed 310,000 workers, that is about 2.1 per cent of
the total labor force. However note that foreign presence is
growing in importance. In 1991 DFI amounted to some 2.2 per cent
of total gross investment; in 1992 to 6.3 per cent, and in 1993 to
11.1 per cent 72. Estimates of the percentage of investment in
69
. Data on investments of $1 million or more (large-scale
investments for short) are collected by PAIZ. GUS gives data on
aggregate investment (large plus small-scale). The PAIZ data which
are cited here are, however, more detailed (and appear to be more
reliable) than the GUS data.
70
. Foreign Trade Research Institute data, cited in Kubielas,
Markowski and Jackson, op. cit.
71
. Calculated on the basis of data given in GUS (1994a) Table
1.4
72
. These estimates were obtained by expressing DFI as a
percentage of total gross investment in current dollars, estimated
by converting the current zloty gross investment figures for 1991,
1992 and 1993 published by GUS (1994) at mid-year dollar-zloty
exchange rates.
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plant and equipment undertaken by enterprises with foreign capital
participation are not fully consistent with the above figures, but
they show a similar trend (Table 7).
Table 7
Investment in buildings and machinery, by source (in trillions of

















(C) (B) as 0.2 5.7 6.4 n.a.
per cent of (A)
Source of data: (A) GUS (1994a), (B) PAIZ.
5. How far is Poland along the road to integration?
In 1988, the penultimate year of the communist regime, Poland
was still an almost-closed economy. The ratio of the value of
internationally traded goods and services (the sum of imports and
of exports) to the GDP equalled only 0.39. Moreover, the Polish
producers were shielded from foreign competition. The exporters to
the CMEA countries had, what amounted to, a guaranteed market73,
while imports of goods competing with domestic products were
73
. Most of the highly differentiated products in the case of
which quality plays a major role were exported to the CMEA;
exports to the West were largely confined to standardized
commodities, such as basic chemicals.
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strictly controlled. By 1992 the trade/GDP ratio rose to 0.49.74
Though the change is not dramatic, it is significant. The change in
the character of trade is, however, even more significant. Polish
products now have to compete with foreign products at home and
abroad. The effects of increased competition are striking, albeit
difficult to document: the quality of a broad range of Polish
products is rapidly improving, and, in some cases it already
matches that of the West.
The integration of Poland in the world economy is largely the
effect of the reforms introduced in 1990 - 1991 by the Solidarity-
led government. In 1990 hyperinflation was brought under control.
The zloty was made convertible and linked to the dollar. Production
and consumption prices were freed, and most of the subsidies were
eliminated. The economy was opened to world trade and to foreign
investment. A treaty of Association was signed with the EEC.
There remained, to be sure, much to be done7"1, but the foundation
of integration were firmly in place.
Since 1991 the tempo of reforms slowed down, and in some
respects, notably in the area of trade policy, there was
retrogression. The question arises whether the initial reforms were
not too radical: a more gradual opening up of the economy would
74
. Based on IMF data
75
. In particular, the debt reduction negotiations were barely
initiated.
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have given more time for adjustment, hence it might have mellowed
the opposition to liberalization. A slower tempo of reform thus
might have led, in the longer run, to greater freedom of trade.
There is no doubt that in 1990 -1991 Poland suffered a severe
trade shock which doubtless contributed to the public's reaction
against reform. Gradual liberalization of trade would not have
reduced, however, the distress of manufacturing industries most
adversely affected by the transition, namely those that were
dependent on CMEA or on military orders, or both76. On the other
hand it may be argued that a mistake was committed by the sudden
liberalization of trade in agricultural products. The shock turned
the peasants who, under communism, constituted a stronghold of
private enterprise, into enemies of reform.
It can be argued, too, that a mistake was made treating
liberalization not as a goal in itself, but as a policy tools.
Under the Balcerowicz regime customs duties were temporarily
reduced or suspended in lieu of currency revaluation - setting a
precedent for the subsequent increase in tariffs for fiscal
purposes. The 1991 tariff revision presented an opportunity to put
into effect a structure that would minimize distortions; instead,
the new schedule deliberately took into account the interests of
individual branches of industry. Subsequent regimes carried this
76
 For estimates of the short-run costs of the dismantling of
CMEA, see Rodrik (1992).
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policy one step further: import and export controls became a means
of winning friends and influencing people.
The retreat from free trade is, however, a passing phenomenon.
The degree to which the Polish government can manipulate trade is
subject to a strong outside check. Poland is firmly committed to
political-economic integration with Western Europe and by the year
2000, Polish industry and financial services (if not necessarily
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